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tee does not limit itself to the question of whether there should
be a death penalty or not. Rather, we grapple with important
ideas which arise from our current death penalty system. Today,
we will study the issue of the death penalty during the time of
national emergency and crisis.
No introduction to a program on the death penalty can be
complete without a reference to the recent decision of Judge Jed
Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York from Thursday, April 25, 2002.1
Anti-death penalty advocates have recently been highlight-
ing specific events in the struggle against capital punishment.
These events, as I define them, are as follows:
Powerful attempts to limit the death penalty from the Gov-
ernor of Illinois, who declared a moratorium on executions in Il-
linois. 2 The report of his commission has been published, rec-
ommending numerous reforms in capital punishment cases.3
Governor Ryan's speech before this Association on December 6,
2000, has recently come out in the St. John's Law Review and is
available now. 4
1 See United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The
court declared its tentative decision to grant defendant's motion to dismiss the
death penalty aspects of the case on the basis that the Federal Death Penalty
Act is unconstitutional. The court, after careful consideration, conclusively de-
clared the Federal Death Penalty Act unconstitutional in a later opinion,
United States v. Quinones, S3 00 Cr. 761, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11631, *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2002). Since the date of the program, the Federal Death Pen-
alty Act declared unconstitutional a second time in United States v. Fell, No.
2:01-CR-12-01, slip op. at 40 (D. Vt. Sept. 24, 2002). The court said that the act
"bases a finding of eligibility for imposition of the death penalty on information
that is not subject to the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of confrontation and
cross-examination, nor to rules of evidentiary admissibility guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause to fact finding involving offense element," relying on,
among other cases, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). The court in Fell
commented that "clapital punishment is under siege." Fell slip op. at 42.
2 See Jodi Wilgoren, Panel in Illinois Seeks to Reform Death Sentence, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at Al (stating that Governor Ryan declared a moratorium
on executions after innocent men were exonerated from death row in Illinois).
3 See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR's COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Apr. 15,
2002), http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/index.html.
4 See Symposium, Governor Ryan's Capital Punishment Moratorium and the
Executioner's Confession: Views From The Governor's Mansion to Death Row, 75
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 401, 407-08 (2001) (discussing the declaration of a death
penalty moratorium in Illinois and the work of the Commission appointed by
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The other key events are the many Innocence Projects that
have been initiated by Peter Neufeld, Barry Scheck, and others,5
and the writings of James Liebman and his colleagues on the
high rate of reversals in capital cases.6
Putting all that aside, there is something new to add as of
the week of April 25, 2002: an attack on the constitutionality of
the federal death penalty by a federal district court judge, Jed
Rakoff, in a straightforward opinion.7 The basis for attack is the
perception that the federal death penalty system threatens the
execution of a meaningful number of innocent persons.8 Indeed,
the opinion cites, among other things, the Liebman Report itself.9
That opinion must, or should, leave some wondering: Why
did I not think of that?We can only imagine what the Second Circuit or Supreme
Court will do on appeal; but, for now, this is a thunderbolt
thrown into the debate by a federal district court judge and flung
in the face of the popularity, although perhaps declining popular-
ity, of the death penalty. It is another reminder of why federal
judges receive life tenure.
The program tonight on The Death Penalty and Terrorism
shall be moderated by Norman Redlich, who has struggled
against the death penalty, and not just its very existence, but
where it exists to make it fairer since the 1950s, and who has a
magnificent career which only begins to be described by the flyer
for this program: Former Dean, NYU Law School. Norman?
Governor Ryan to reevaluate the Illinois Criminal Code as efforts to prevent the
execution of innocent individuals).
5 See Fighting the Good Fight, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at A10 (noting that
Neufeld and Scheck are founders of the Innocence Project at New York's Ye-
shiva University Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, which has helped exoner-
ate individuals through the use of DNA evidence).
6 See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN, et. al, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995 (June 12, 2000), available at
http://justice.policy.net/jpreport/index.html.
7 See United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also
United States v. Quinones, S3 00 Cr. 761, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11631, *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2002).
8 See Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (noting that, despite safeguards, inno-
cent individuals-mostly of color-are sentenced to death).
9 See id. at 418.
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Norman Redlich
Norman Greene is a great chair of a committee. The minute
one suggests a topic, Norman turns around and says, "That is a
great idea. Why don't you organize the program?" So, here I am.
Let me just mention that there are two things that we are
not going to discuss. So, if you want to leave, you can leave now.
Those two things are the merits of military tribunals as such.
We are also not going to discuss, unless we arrive at it indirectly,
the question of the merits, or the lack thereof, of the death pen-
alty. We are going to discuss the death penalty in an age of ter-
rorism.
The basic purpose of the program is to discuss how govern-
ments respond to the type of national, as distinct from individual,
crimes that are represented by the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Our law with regard to the
death penalty has been formed through the process of litigating
so-called "normal" acts of individual crimes with the resultant
taking of individual lives. Conversely, this country and others
have sought to invoke the criminal justice system in times of cri-
ses only to find that such laws, which were designed for "tradi-
tional" crimes, must be twisted, sometimes beyond recognition, in
order to cope with times of crises.
We have had an example, those of you who are my age or
somewhat my age, during the Cold War.
Terrorist attacks trigger factors that are not present in ordi-
nary first-degree murder cases. The targets are different, as are
the levels of premeditation and public response, among other fac-
tors. Traditionally, our law of the death penalty has been formed
in the context of individual crimes. Thus, we are concerned
about such things as competence of counsel; the mental state of
the defendant; issues of premeditation; the attitude of jurors to-
ward the death penalty, et cetera. The overarching question is
often whether a system that applies a standard of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt can impose a penalty that is based upon guilt
beyond any doubt. Nevertheless, some argue that our normal
criminal justice system is well equipped to handle trials of terror-
ists who may be charged with planning, or implementing, the
World Trade Center attack.
David Bruck is presently on what he thinks is a quasi-
vacation, acting as a scholar-in-residence at the Washington and
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Lee School of Law, which in terms of the work that he is doing
and the location that he is in, is far different from the courtrooms
or the cases that he normally defends. David Bruck is, in the
area of the capital defenders system, very much a household
name, and I am pleased to introduce him to you this evening.
David Bruck
Well, thank you very much.
I am, as Dean Redlich indicated, speaking to you from the
perspective of a practicing trial lawyer and someone whose job
includes kibitzing, I suppose one would say, most of the federal
terrorism capital cases that have occurred, or are occurring now,
in the United States.
The question of whether the death penalty should be applied
in terrorism cases is often posed as one of statutory innovation:
should we legislate a death penalty for terrorists? But all of that
is all water under the bridge. The American criminal justice sys-
tem already prosecutes terrorist offenses, but not, as a rule, ter-
rorist cases. Rather, it treats them simply as crimes of violence,
as ordinary criminal offenses, and as such there has long been
federal death penalty jurisdiction over terrorist cases.'0
One aspect of our approach to terrorist prosecutions that
could use a lot more reflection than it has received so far is that
our jurisdiction over terrorist cases extends worldwide. Ours is
the one country in the world in a position to assert such global
jurisdiction and make it stick. We can, and do, take people from
countries all over the world who have committed crimes against
United States interests or against United States citizens, and
bring them to the United States for trial. And since the enact-
ment of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, which restored a
generally enforceable death penalty in the federal criminal jus-
tice system, we claim the right to execute such people once we
have brought them here and convicted them of murder in our
courts."
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000) (listing criminal offenses that warrant the impo-
sition of the death penalty).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that because Title 18 prohibits attacks on federal facilities, the United
States has jurisdiction to enforce its laws and retain personal jurisdiction over a
foreigner who resided in this country when he committed the federal crime); see
also United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that
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In that sense, the current war against terrorism in our
criminal courts places the United States in a position to become
the world's executioner. I use that term advisedly, because this
globalization of the American death penalty system occurs at a
time when almost the entire democratic world, and certainly the
entire Western democratic world, has abolished capital punish-
ment-except for us. 12
The history of our use of the death penalty for international
terrorist cases is still rather short. We all recall the Nairobi Em-
bassy bombing case, in which the two defendants faced, but did
not receive, the death penalty at the hands of a New York City
jury.13 Of course, now the Moussaoui case is pending.14 One
might have thought that the government would draw a sobering
lesson about the irrelevance of the death penalty in international
terrorism cases from its failure to obtain a death sentence in the
Nairobi Embassy bombing case. But it quickly became clear that
the government drew a somewhat narrower lesson from the New
York verdict: next time, do not let a Manhattan jury make the
call. The government will not make that particular mistake
again; we have Moussaoui-and probably most other interna-
tional death penalty cases after his-being tried in Alexandria.
I myself have been appointed to a much more obscure inter-
national terrorism case involving a Palestinian member of the
Abu Nidal Organization who was involved in the very bloody hi-
jacking of Pan Am flight 73 in Karachi in 1986. This man was
initially sentenced to death by the Pakistanis, imprisoned for fif-
teen years, and then handed over to the Americans after 9/11 for
trial in Washington, D.C. His Pakistani death sentence was
commuted by Benazir Bhutto as part of the return of democracy
a foreign sovereign may prosecute a defendant for the same offense previously
prosecuted for in a different jurisdiction), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 924 (2001).
12 See George Anastaplo, Penalty of Death Read in a Newlight, CHI. DAILY L.
BULLETIN, Apr. 25, 1998, at 23 (noting that capital punishment has become rare
in the industrialized Western world).
13 See Benjamin Weiser, Jury Rejects Death Penalty for Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2001, at B1 (stating that a jury deadlocked on whether to impose the
death penalty on Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhali, who bombed the Ameri-
can Embassy in Nairobi, which killed 213 people).
14 See Robert O'Harrow Jr., Moussaoui Ordered to Stand Trial in Alexandria,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2001, at A15 (stating that Zacarias Moussauoi, the only
living suspect in the United States formally linked to September 11, 2001 terror
attacks, was ordered by a federal judge to stand trial for conspiracy).
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to Pakistan. Now that particular bit of democratic progress
stands to be undone in a courtroom in the District of Columbia,
where the United States government is attempting to apply the
1994 death penalty law retroactively to that 1996 hijacking case
in Pakistan.
I think the recent case that most clearly suggests where we
are headed-that it has not yet actually come to fruition-is the
indictment returned in New Jersey in the Daniel Pearl murder. 15
There a New Jersey federal grand jury has returned a capital in-
dictment against a Pakistani terrorist for the murder of an
American in Pakistan. 16
This kind of global death penalty jurisdiction is a new phe-
nomenon. The arrest, the prosecution, the bringing of foreigners
to the United States to try them for their lives is something that
we have never attempted before now, and I think it is something
that we should consider a little more deliberately and thought-
fully than we have so far.
It is striking that the two other countries most challenged by
terrorism in our lifetime, Israel and the United Kingdom, have
taken a different path. Both countries made very hard-nosed and
deliberate decisions not to use the death penalty in terrorism
cases. 17 Their reasoning was that whatever the merits of capital
punishment in general, it was clearly counterproductive in fight-
ing terrorism because the death penalty makes martyrs of terror-
ists and thus, actually advances the political program of terrorist
organizations.' 8
We have made a different calculation in this country, if we
can call it a calculation, but I think what we have really done for
the most part is simply allowed our domestic political death pen-
alty system to bleed over, with very little reflection and analysis,
into the international arena. In overseas cases, we are con-
15 See Seth Mydans, Trial in Murder of Reporter Begins with Legal Maneuvers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A6.
16 See Dexter Filkins, Four in Pearl Murder Are Found Guilty in Pakistan
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2002, at Al (Ahmed Omar Sheikh was sentenced to
death, typically by hanging, while three other men received life imprisonment).
17 See Thomas M. McDonnell, A Potentially Explosive Execution, NAT'L. L.J.,
July 7, 1997, at A17 (noting that former Great Britain Prime Minister John Ma-
jor, former Israeli Prime Minster Yitzhak Rabin, and former West German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt opposed attempts to reintroduce the death penalty
to their respective countries).
18 Id.
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fronted with ghastly homicides which, by their very logic, impel
this sort of reasoning: if we seek the death penalty in a kidnap-
ping case involving one murder, surely we have to seek it in an
embassy bombing involving two hundred.
So here we are, following a very different course than Eng-
land, or Israel, or indeed all of the other Western democracies,
and with not a great deal of thought given to where this course is
leading us.
Well, where is it leading us? The reasoning that prevailed in
the parliamentary debates in England in the 1970s and 1980s,
when the death penalty was rejected, and rejected again, and in
Israel ever since 1954 (when the death penalty was first abol-
ished by statute), has been driven home by the situation in which
we now find ourselves. We face a terrorist enemy who is moti-
vated by martyrdom. This stands entire notion of the death pen-
alty as a deterrent on its head. We are trying to use the threat of
death as a means of intimidating people who signed up for death
when they became our adversaries.
Having been involved directly, as defense counsel, in one of
the al Qaeda prosecutions, I can tell you that in the world of mar-
tyrdom it doesn't get any better than to be captured by the
United States, brought to New York, or to Alexandria, Virginia,
tried on a world stage, and then ritually put to death by the
United States. That's the gold standard of martyrdom. For
someone who considers blowing himself up on a plane to be a
good thing, getting executed by the United States is as good as it
gets.
Not only would such a fate be chosen by the defendant, but it
would also be the ending selected by the organizers of terrorist
attacks, because of the incomparable melodrama of martyrdom
that it bestows on the terrorist cause. And this is not nearly so
true once the death penalty is taken out of the equation.
So we are learning through experience what the Israelis and
the British figured out simply by the use of common sense, with-
out actually having to go through this self-defeating process.
We are also starting to learn that fighting terrorism with the
death penalty is a great deal simpler in theory than in practice,
because of what we might describe as the "foot soldier problem."
This stems from the fact that the closer one is to the actual busi-
ness of murdering civilians, the more likely one will be a very
low-ranking member of the organization. Among terrorists, as
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among everybody else, murder is a blue-collar job. The higher up
in the organization a defendant is claimed to be, the more at-
tenuated the question of responsibility, and the more difficult the
proof.
Then, sometimes, even the foot soldiers themselves are diffi-
cult to tie to a particular act. We may soon discover, for example,
that prosecuting Zacarias Moussaoui-the so-called "20th hi-
jacker"-is a far dicier proposition on the question of what con-
nection, if any, Mr. Moussaoui actually had to the 9/11 actions
than the public has assumed. When we get into the actual de-
tails of exactly who did what to whom in international terrorism
cases, we find that the proof can be exceedingly hard to come
by-much more so than in the ordinary capital prosecution in a
domestic court.
I have spoken about the obvious lack of deterrent value in us-
ing the death penalty against organizations and individuals who
are motivated by a desire for martyrdom. The same is true with
respect to the retributive value of the death penalty. It is a pun-
ishment that we fear much more than does our terrorist adver-
sary in al Qaeda, and it holds more retributive significance to us
than it does to the people on whom we are proposing to use it.
But while the death penalty is not something that our oppo-
nents fear, it is demoralizing and extremely disturbing to our al-
lies. In fact, we are finding that our global anti-terrorist coalition
is being put at risk by our use of the death penalty.
To take one recent example: the effort of the U.S. Attorney in
the Eastern District of Virginia to gather some "counter-
mitigation" evidence by going to France and interviewing Mr.
Moussaoui's family (without, of course, telling them the purpose
of their inquiry) turned into a diplomatic incident when it turned
out the French government had no idea that the FBI and an As-
sistant U.S. Attorney were in France to gather penalty phase
evidence against Moussaoui. 19 The French have, for the time be-
ing at least, withdrawn their cooperation from the case. And
such episodes are likely to occur again and again, as we try to
enlist the help of democratic allies whose assistance and whose
unstinting and reflexive and immediate support we must have in
the struggle against terrorism in the world
19 See Philip Shenon & Benjamin Weiser, Prosecutors Seek a Death Sentence in
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at Al.
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So the death penalty in international terror cases produces a
new crop of problems: on top of the moral and political issues
that we have struggled with for generations, we now have some
real trade-offs in the area of national security to consider. Is it
worth the costs to our anti-terror alliances to have this burr un-
der our saddle? The death penalty is very likely to be a continual
irritant between us and the rest of the democratic world, which
finds our enthusiasm for this peculiar institution to be increas-
ingly troublesome and embarrassing.
Now, the last point to be made about this is that our own
government is not very well set up to consider the trade-off be-
tween the diplomatic and the national security costs of the death
penalty, as against whatever marginal deterrent or retributive
value it may have. For by treating these crimes as ordinary
criminal offenses, we vest decision-making in the Justice De-
partment, in the FBI, and in domestic law enforcement agencies.
These are government agencies which do not normally consider,
and indeed have doctrinal reasons why they normally should not
and will not consider, the international political consequences of
prosecutorial decisions. So, in a sense, we are institutionally
blind.
That is not to say that the State Department or the White
House might never weigh in with some countervailing diplomatic
or national security reason why the death penalty ought not to be
imposed in a particular case. But as a general matter, our sys-
tem is not set up that way.
On the contrary, it is set up for a kind of consistency: like
cases should be treated similarly. So if Attorney General
Ashcroft is going to direct the Department of Justice to seek the
death penalty in a case in Texas or Missouri or Vermont that in-
volves two murders, the Department certainly has to seek it for a
murder like that of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, or
for the bombing of an embassy in Kenya in which 220 people are
killed.
And thus we have a crude sort of consistency driving policy. This
despite the undeniable fact that the complex realities of fighting
terrorism should be informed by much more than whether we
have a consistent policy about enforcing the death penalty in
criminal cases.
This need for consistency-the notion that if we going to im-
pose the death penalty on ordinary domestic criminals, we cannot
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very well take a pass on the Nairobi embassy bombing-
illustrates how the death penalty itself begins to acquire inde-
pendent force in decision-making. It is as though the death pen-
alty, because of the belief that it must be applied consistently and
predictably if at all, becomes almost a party that makes its own
demands, and exerts its own pressures. If we are going to have
it-and of course it is always a political given that we must have
it-we must actually apply it here, and we must apply it there.
That is a great danger, I think, and something that we really
must come to terms with as a country. Whether the death pen-
alty is good or bad, it is supposed to be a tool to be used by us.
We are not supposed to be its tool. But the reflexive and some-
what unthinking way in which the death penalty is being applied
in terrorism cases gives us some cause to fear that that sort of
inversion of roles may have occurred.
Perhaps the country's growing skepticism about the death
penalty at home, and the evident weakening of political support
for it,20 will in the fullness of time create the political space we
need to begin thinking critically about the use of the death pen-
alty even in these extreme cases. Or especially in these cases.
And the sooner the better-for our effort against terrorism, and
for our country.
Thank you.
Norman Redlich
Thank you, David.
At some point I am going to ask you to think about, and I
will warn you in advance, giving the Israeli example.
The Israelis were smart enough to make genocide a separate
crime. Even though they have abolished the death penalty, they
did execute Eichmann.21 In the 1950s, when I used to spend a lot
of time going around to churches and synagogues speaking
against the death penalty, someone would invariably raise his or
her hand and say, "Vhat about Eichmann?"
After a while I gave my response, "Any time a state wants to
abolish the death penalty for any crime except genocide I will be
pleased to join in that recommendation."
Of course, when one talks about the Israeli experience, one
20 See Jim Yardley, Death and the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at 3
(noting that many states are reviewing their capital sentencing schemes).
21 See Zvi AHARONI & WILHELM DIETI, OPERATION EICHMANN: THE TRUTH ABOUT
THE PURSUIT, CAPrURE AND TRIAL 172 (Helmut Bogler trans., 1996).
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has to bear in mind that they dealt with the very problem that
we have been dealing with by creating another crime called geno-
cide, and thereby not subjecting Eichmann to the ordinary crimi-
nal justice system.
Paul Saunders is an old friend. He is a partner at the law
firm of Cravath Swaine & Moore. He is a board member and
former co-chair of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law. Perhaps not of great importance, but I have been bothering
him for weeks and weeks, and months and months, because I
have been teaching a course on separation of powers and the
structural constitution and I have been constantly calling him,
asking for his wisdom with regard to military tribunals, because
he is about the only person I know who has ever had any real ex-
perience with military tribunals.
Paul was a JAG officer, served in the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Corps from 1967 to 1971. He is a great lawyer, a lawyer in
the highest tradition, and somebody who really knows something
about how the criminal justice system works within the context
of military tribunals and is in a position to tell us the extent to
which that system can be applied to what it purports to apply to
here, namely the war against terrorism.
Paul?
Paul Saunders
Thank you very much, Norman.
I am delighted that this evening has come, because maybe it
will bring an end to Norman's questions, which I get once every
other day or so. They are always questions about the laws of war
or courts martial or military tribunals. Most of them are ques-
tions that I cannot answer. So, I am especially glad that tonight
has come, and maybe his questions are going to be answered. I
can only pray for the end of Norman's course to come.
Norman started out by saying that we are not going to talk
about military tribunals as such or whether they are authorized
or constitutional. I do not propose to do that either, although I
am going to talk about the death penalty and courts martial and
military tribunals, and I am going to talk a little bit about the
historical basis for the death penalty in courts martial and mili-
tary tribunals, and I am going to say something about the most
recent military order of the President that establishes military
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tribunals. 22
Let me start by articulating a few general principles about
capital punishment and courts martial.
First, although today courts martial do have broad authority
to impose the death penalty that has not always been the case.
Second, it is also true that courts martial today do have authority
to prosecute offenses against the laws of war. It is not entirely
clear, however, what that means or what the laws of war are.
That is especially true if one attempts to define terrorism as a
violation of the laws of war.
Third, the United States Supreme Court recently has held
that courts martial may impose the death penalty even though
the procedures followed by courts martial imposing the death
penalty do not fully comply with the Eighth Amendment. That is
the Loving case. 23 I am not going to go into a great detailed dis-
cussion of that. The basis has something to do with whether
delegation is really delegation from the Congress or not, 24 but in
any event the holding of that case is that courts martial are free,
perhaps within limits, perhaps not, to impose the death penalty
even though all the Eighth Amendment protections have not
been met.25
Finally, I guess I would say that putting all of those to-
gether, my conclusion is that the use of military tribunals to try
terrorists who are not at least traditional combatants, as we have
understood the term combatants, for violations of the laws of war
and to impose the death penalty on those persons, comes so close
to the line that my own view is that that ought not to occur. That
is, we ought not to try terrorists by this quite artificial, although
long known in history, procedure that we call military commis-
sions or military tribunals.
Throughout history, there has been a deep mistrust of courts
martial. I think in part this mistrust goes much earlier than the
creation of this country. It goes all the way back to the time of
Richard II when there was a real distrust of courts martial or
military justice, such as it was, in the early days in England.
In any event, the founders of this country well understood
22 See Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831 (Nov. 16,
2001).
23 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
24 Id. at 769.
25Id.
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the distrust that the general populace had for justice by military
courts. In fact, although in the beginning courts martial had the
power to authorize the death penalty, they could only authorize
the death penalty for military type crimes. In the first Articles of
War, which in this country were the predecessor to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, in the very first Articles of War during
the Revolutionary War, military commanders were enjoined to
turn over to civilian authorities members who had committed
what were called ordinary capital cases; that is, cases that might
qualify for the imposition of capital punishment or the death
penalty but that were not military type offenses.
So, even from the very beginning of the establishment of
courts martial in this country there was a mistrust of the ability
of courts martial to impose truly impartial justice, and especially
to impose capital punishment in what were thought to be regular
civilian type crimes.
During the Civil War, the Congress did grant courts martial
the power to impose capital punishment over non-military or so-
called common law capital crimes, but only if they were commit-
ted during wartime. In 1916, again by an amendment to the Ar-
ticles of War, courts martial were given the power to impose the
death penalty over civilian common-law type crimes, except-this
is in non-wartime--except murder and rape. Courts martial
could not impose the death penalty in those cases.
In 1950 the Articles of War became the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. The Uniform Code of Military Justice gave
courts martial jurisdiction over four types of murder for which
they could impose the death penalty. The Supreme Court, as I
said, has upheld the authority of courts martial to impose capital
punishment in those cases, even though the procedures used do
not comply with the procedures that the Supreme Court requires
in all other capital cases.
Now, how far that goes is a matter of some debate. There is
in fact a statute on the books, it is still on the books-Article 106
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 26 It preceded the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice. It was in the Articles of War. It
has been in the Articles of War for a long time. That statute pro-
hibits the offense of spying. After a conviction of the offense of
spying the death penalty is mandatory. It is the only statute
26 See 10 U.S.C. § 906 (2000).
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that I know of in the United States for which the death penalty is
mandatory. If you are convicted of spying under Article 106 you
must be put to death.27
So, and I must say I have never had any experience with Ar-
ticle 106. I do not know anybody who ever has, but theoretically
if you are prosecuted and convicted of the crime of spying, then
there is no sentencing procedure whatsoever-it does not matter.
There are no mitigating circumstances, or aggravating circum-
stances; you must be put to death. Whether that is constitutional
or not, I have no idea. We may see that tested in the coming
days under the so-called military tribunals.
Now, that leads me to the general question of military tribu-
nals. First, what do we know about them?
We know that military tribunals were used during the Revo-
lutionary War.28 We know that there were military tribunals
used during the Civil War.29 These are not courts martial. So, to
the extent that courts martial come under the judicial branch of
our government, military tribunals do not. They are not courts.
There is no appeal from the decision of a military tribunals to the
civilian courts.30
So, they have been used for a long time in our history. We do
not know a lot about them, and the scholarship is actually quite
confusing, and I am not going to take the time of this audience to
go into the details of the scholarship behind military tribunals
except to say that we know a few things about them.
During the Civil War we know that the Supreme Court said
they could not be used to prosecute civilians when the civil courts
were open. That is Ex Parte-Milligan.31 We do know that they
were used in the Second World War, and the most important, in-
teresting case is the case of the Nazi saboteurs, the eight sabo-
teurs who were prosecuted by military commission or military
tribunal in Washington.32
27 Id.
28 See Robert H. Bork, Having Their Day in (a Military) Court, NA'L REV., Dec.
17, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/17dec01/borkl2l70l.shtml.29 Id.
30 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Government Sets Rules for Military on War Tribu-
nals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at A19.
31 See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) (stating that civilians
have the privilege of trial by a jury).
32 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1942); see also Diane F. Orentlicher &
Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Be-
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What is interesting about that case is that the Supreme
Court had great difficulty trying to figure out how or why they
could be prosecuted.33 ' You may remember that when they
landed in Long Island and in Florida the first thing that they did
was to bury their uniforms in the sand and then to infiltrate
themselves into the civil population.34
Well, when they did that they were no longer lawful combat-
ants. So, the Supreme Court created another category that it
called unlawful combatants. 35 If they were lawful combatants,
they would have been prisoners of war and they would have had
all of the rights that prisoners of war normally have.36 In this
case, the Supreme Court said they were unlawful combatants, so
they did not have any of those rights.37 They were prosecuted.
The Supreme Court in Quirin, a case on a writ of habeas corpus,
held that the military commissions did have jurisdiction to prose-
cute the saboteurs, 38 although the basis for that jurisdiction is far
from clear,39 and the opinion has been criticized at great length.
They were prosecuted. The trial lasted a couple of weeks.
They were convicted. They were sentenced to death.40  Six of
them were actually put to death very shortly after they were con-
victed.41 So, the second thing that we know about military tribu-
nals is that they, at least historically, have had power to impose
the death penalty.
fore Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 653, 656-57 (2002) (dis-
cussing the eight Nazi saboteurs and the President's order for their trial by
military tribunals).
3 See George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed
Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 635, 641-42 (2002) (discussing
the fact that there was uncertainty in regards to how to prosecute the sabo-
teurs).
34 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21 (discussing how the Nazi saboteurs
landed in America in 1942).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 35, at 657 (discussing the Court's de-
cision to send the combatants to trial in front of military tribunal because they
were unlawful combatants).
38 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46.
39 See id. at 46 (noting that the parameters of jurisdiction of military tribunals
is not well defined).
40 Id.
41 See Maj. Michael 0. Lacey, Military Commissions: A Historical Survey, ARMY
LAw., Mar. 2002, 41, 46.
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The next, the other most famous case involving military tri-
bunals of course is the Yamashita42 case. That is the Japanese
general. What is interesting is that he was tried in the Philip-
pines. He was in uniform; he did not bury his uniform. He was
in uniform and he was prosecuted for violating the laws of war.
The law was that he failed to supervise his troops, who had
committed atrocities in the Philippines. 43 Yamashita was prose-
cuted again on very short notice by a military commission in the
Philippines and sentenced to death.44
So, this now brings me to a discussion of the current Order
that creates military tribunals. I want to discuss that in the con-
text of the death penalty and see what we know about it.
The first thing that we know about the military order is that
it authorizes the trial of non-citizen civilians. 45 Now, courts mar-
tial on the other hand have extremely limited jurisdiction over
civilians. It is possible to prosecute civilians who are with the
military in the field overseas in times of war, but except for very
narrowly defined categories such as that, courts martial in this
country do not have the power to prosecute civilians, but under
the Military Order, the military tribunals do.
The second thing we know about the order is that it author-
izes the trial of terrorists and those who conspire with them or
harbor them. In fact, you have to be declared a terrorist before
these tribunals will have jurisdiction over you.
Now, what is curious about that is that being a terrorist is a
status. You do not theoretically know whether one is a terrorist
unless and until one has been convicted of a crime that we would
call terrorism. If you are not a terrorist, military tribunals have
no jurisdiction over you.
Now, there is a definition of terrorism in the Patriots Act, 46
which was passed shortly after the September 11th attacks, but
42 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
43 Id. at 13 (stating the charge against General Yamashita).
4 Id. at5.
45 See Maj. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts Martial:
A Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between
the Two Courts, ARMy LAW., Mar. 2002, at 19 (indicating that President Bush's
new order authorizes trial of non U.S. citizens for war crimes by military tribu-
nals); see also Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, The Military Tri-
bunal Order: When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military
Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 653, 655-56 (2002).
46 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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that definition of terrorism is not very satisfactory, and in fact
may not even apply to those who were responsible for the Sep-
tember 11th attacks, because the definition has an intent re-
quirement. You have to intend to do certain things. It is unclear
whether one could ever prove such an intent in a case against
those who were responsible for the September 11th attacks.
The third thing that we know about the military order that
is of interest is that it authorized a prosecution for violations of
the laws of war and other applicable laws.
You might ask the question that Norman has been asking
me for the last month, "WVhat are the laws of war? How do you
know when you have violated the laws of war?"
The answer is that throughout history the laws of war have
meant different things to different people. Even today it is quite
unclear what the laws of war are. There are certain interna-
tional conventions that purport to define some of the laws of war.
For example, the Geneva Convention of 1949 defines how you
have to treat prisoners of war.47 Presumably, if you treat prison-
ers of war in a way different from what the Geneva Convention
dictates, you have violated the laws of war. The laws of war,
generally speaking, are not codified. The Constitution gives the
Congress the power to define the laws of nations, which pre-
sumably includes the power to define the laws of war, but the
Congress really has not done so in a comprehensive way. The
perfect example of that would be General Yamashita's offense-
for which he was convicted-probably was not an offense that
was described anywhere in the then existing Articles of War, or
in any existing international convention.48 In any event, he was
prosecuted and convicted.
The laws of war again have a very long history.49 The
Greeks thought that the most important thing when you went to
war was to have a declared war. The war had to be declared with
great formality. The Greek battles were fought typically in open
fields, so there was never any question about involving non-
combatants in the wars. They just were not there. The Romans,
47 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
48 See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 42 (noting that the trial and conviction of an en-
emy general for actions taken during war is unprecedented in history).
49 See generally MICHAEL ELIOT HOWARD, THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON
WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (Michael Howard et al. eds, 1994).
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on the other hand, did not follow any such rules. The Romans, as
far as anybody can tell, really did not follow anything that one
might recognize as the laws of war.
The Crusaders, on the other hand, followed a very strict code
of chivalry. Because if you violated the code of chivalry in battle,
you might lose your knighthood. The Crusaders were very con-
cerned about following certain rigorous rules in the way in which
they conducted wars. They also held prisoners for ransom.
There was never any question about mistreating prisoners or
killing prisoners of war, because the Crusaders, at the end of the
hostilities, wanted to trade the prisoners for ransom.50
Well, I am not going to discuss at great length the history of
the laws of war, except to say that if we think we are about to
prosecute terrorists and to impose the death penalty on terrorists
for violations of the laws of war, at least the way they have been
articulated in our history of military commissions and military
tribunals, it is theoretically possible to prosecute, convict, and
execute a terrorist who is not a combatant for violation of some
law of war that has yet to be defined in a prosecution in which
there will be no appeal to any independent court of the type we
are used to seeing.
Now, that would be, I think, a very, very grave misapplica-
tion of the system of justice that we have created and that we
have spent a long time nurturing and defining. But it is at least
theoretically possible.
One last thing on the laws of war. In 1865, after John
Wilkes Booth died, the then Attorney General of the United
States was asked by the President whether, if he had survived,
Booth could have been prosecuted by a military tribunal-not a
court martial, a military tribunal-for a violation of the law of
war. The Attorney General opined that not only could John
Wilkes Booth have been prosecuted for violating the laws of war
when he assassinated President Lincoln, but that he had to be
prosecuted by military tribunal for violating the laws of war, and
that no civilian court could stop such a prosecution.5'
Booth was not a combatant. He was a civilian. He was not a
soldier. That was just a detail for the Attorney General because
he said, "Well, he must have been a secret belligerent."
50See BARBARAW. TUcHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR 62, 81 (1978).
51 Military Commissions, 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 297 (1867).
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Then he said, "Well, what was the law of war that he vio-
lated in assassinating the President?" The Attorney General said
that we know it was a violation of the laws of war because when
Booth assassinated the President, you remember his words, "Sic
semper tyrannis."5 2 When Booth died, he said to the doctor, "Say
to my mother that I died for my country."53
From that evidence the Attorney General concluded that
John Wilkes Booth acted as a "public foe", violated the laws of
war, and could be prosecuted only by a military tribunal, and
then presumably sentenced to death.54
Now, that is the history that we are dealing with. It is not a
pleasant history. It is a very unsettling and unsatisfactory his-
tory, but it is a reality and that is what we are facing when we
face the theoretical imposition of the death penalty on non-
combatant terrorists by a military tribunal.
Thank you very much.
Norman Redlich
Well, Paul, now I know why I could never get an answer-
because there is none.
Our next speaker is a true academic in a world of academics.
Richard Weisberg is a professor of law. He is the Floersheimer
Professor of Constitutional Law at Benjamin Cardozo School of
Law on lower Fifth Avenue in New York.
Now, we asked Professor Weisberg to join this panel because
he has written an outstanding book, which has been very favora-
bly reviewed, on "Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France."55
There we had an example of a civilian government that was try-
ing to deal with a time of crisis, and we have an example of how
that government responded to this time of crisis. That has been
the emphasis that Professor Weisberg has placed on his scholar-
ship in recent months and recent years. We thought that the in-
52 ASIA BOOTH CLARKE, JOHN WILKES BOOTH: A SISTER'S MEMOIR 99 (Terry Al-
ford, ed., Univ. Press of Miss. 1996).
53 Id. See Opinion on the Constitutional Power of the Military to Try and Exe-
cute the Assassins of the President, Op. Att'y Gen. 14 (July 1865), available at
http://207.158.193.20/documents/Bplactl6.pdf.
54 See Louis J. WEICHMANN, A TRUE HISTORY OF THE ASSASSINATION OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN AND OF THE CONSPIRACY OF 1865 234 (Floyd E. Risvold ed., Alfred A
Knopf 1975).
55 RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (N.Y. Univ.
Press 1996).
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sights derived from the Vichy experiment and the Vichy experi-
ence would be useful to this panel.
Professor Weisberg.
Richard Weisberg
As Norman Redlich has said, the example of France during
the period of the Holocaust, known as Vichy, provides a caution-
ary tale for us today when we ourselves are facing what the gov-
ernment calls the threat of terrorism.
The Vichy period is one that I want to discuss with you actu-
ally in terms of two men, three special courts, and two films. I do
not think you can really discuss France these days without at
least a mention of cinema, and it turns out that these special ju-
risdictions that I am going to talk to you about tonight have been
depicted in films that you may be familiar with. To the extent
that a long program may leave you with less of the details that
you might have wanted to take out of something like this, you not
only have the written proceedings of our panel to come back to in
a few months, but you can go out to your neighborhood theater
and see a couple of these films, which actually focus on special
jurisdictions and special courts.
The two men I want to talk to you about are Robert Badinter
and Joseph Barthelemy. One of these men you probably are fa-
miliar with. Badinter was the Justice Minister in France under
Mitterand, a very courageous individual, and took it upon his
own shoulders to get the French in the early 1980s to abolish
capital punishment.
Badinter had become depressed and demoralized by the
practice of capital punishment in France, a practice that still
used the guillotine, just as people on this panel and in this coun-
try have become shocked at the various ways in which we inflict
and implement capital punishment. (Indeed, some recent pro-
gress on capital punishment in United States courts and in a
general public revulsion toward capital punishment may have
more to do with the methods we have used like the electric chair,
which have become increasingly inhumane in their effects, than
on the average American's sense of the morality or immorality of
capital punishment.)
Badinter, while in private practice, had seen some of his own
clients guillotined. While in the government, this experience,
plus his own view of French history and jurisprudence, motivated
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him to try to convince the National Assembly to abolish the death
penalty.
Badinter, though, was also influenced in his feeling about
capital punishment by the period of Vichy France, the period
from 1940 to 1944, when there was an explosion of new capital
crimes administered and implemented by new courts.56 About
600 people died at the hands of these courts in France. The pro-
cedures were summary in nature. Individuals typically could not
appeal and they were typically executed classically at sunrise,
the day after the proceedings took place.
They were the result of a felt experience within France, de-
moralized by the defeat at the hands of the Nazis, but still very
much in control of its own criminal procedure and its own courts,
a felt experience that they were at risk from what they called ter-
rorism. Terrorism consisted at the time really of a kind of three-
headed monster, as they saw it: Gaullists, Jews, and Commu-
nists.
We have a different way of thinking and of imaging the ter-
rorists that we are conjuring and dealing with today, but the idea
is similar. There are people who, by their very status, by their
very nature, create a threat to everyone, and a threat that
somehow the ordinary courts and even the ordinary military
courts cannot handle. This is the atmosphere in this country
post-9/11, as good people on both sides of the issue debate and
become more knowledgeable about the executive branch's orders
and plans for special jurisdictions and special courts.
The other individual I want to talk to you about is much less
well known, I think, to you, although I speak about him quite a
bit in my book. His name was Joseph Barthelemy. He is a figure
from the period in question, from the Vichy period.
The reason I want to emphasize Barthelemy is the following.
He was the second Justice Minister in the Vichy regime, which,
as you recall, was a regime set up by Marshall Petain, the octo-
genarian hero of Verdun, who was called to become the head of
this demoralized French country after the defeat, and who set up
an autonomous government. The Germans okayed this, in the
southern zone, a government that wound up issuing, without
much if any German insistence, almost 200 laws that related to
56 See id. at 114 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1996) (noting the so-called special section
courts that denied wrongdoers the right to appeal).
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the Jewish population in their midst, an astoundingly fecund pe-
riod of legislation that the French themselves did, which often
exceeded the German models both in terms of the definition of
who was a Jew and in terms of the procedures that were set up in
order to deal with the problem.
Eventually, as you know, 75,000 Jews died under color of
French law in the camps in the east. Three thousand more died
on French soil in French-administered special camps. They did
not call them concentration camps on French soil. They were not
death camps, but they were camps administered with absolutely
no attention to hygiene or to humane conditions.
That is not our topic for tonight, because all of those laws
were administered by France's ordinary courts in a four-year pe-
riod. The magistrates and the administrative courts in France
managed to take charge of these complex definitional problems
and were adjudicating questions of who was a Jew long after D-
Day and even when Allied bombs were falling on French court-
houses. The French have a particular logical drive; I call it desic-
cated Cartesianism, which is not dessert, but something to think
about, a sense of pushing something through to its logical conclu-
sion, even when it does not make any sense to do it anymore.
That is the history of the ordinary courts dealing with the
stranger in their midst, dealing with a similar issue, which is the
issue of a status group that was threatening to the country.
There is some overlap because in the special courts, the
courts that went against terrorists, Jews were one of three com-
ponents, but there were also the Communists and the Gaullists.
Barthelemy was a pre-war liberal. I want to emphasize this
with you today as we think about what is going on in the United
States in terms of the debates about special jurisdictions.
The thinking going into these courts, and other emergency
measures that are going on, does not pit left-wing and right-wing
individuals against each other. There are proponents and oppo-
nents on all sides of the political spectrum. Barthelemy was a
liberal anti-fascist and anti-anti-Semite before the war, but when
Petain called him down to the government to become the second
Justice Minister, he rationalized extraordinary measures that, as
a law professor which he was before the war, he would have
found to be anathema and repulsive under French traditions of
equality and due process.
Emergency times do funny things to good people. What is
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one person's emergency is another person's commonplace. What
makes it necessary for one person to seek a new court, or a new
system, or a new set of procedures, to another may seem exactly
what the safeguards within the traditional judicial and criminal
justice system were designed to protect against. Crisis does not
necessarily require innovation.
Barthelemy was the epitome, really, of French pre-war tradi-
tional thinking about constitutional law. The French have very
similar views as ours about due process. They were way ahead of
us when it came to concepts like equal protection. Times of ne-
cessity tend to see a disappearance, sometimes in the twinkling
of an eye, but it usually really takes more thought on the part of
a person of this distinction, a gradual move towards the accep-
tance of what hitherto would have been completely unacceptable
within that person's own mind.
I think a little of this, as we go through the post-9/11 period,
a little of this sense of gradualism, of rationalization, is occurring
among not only good people, fine people, but extremely respect-
able individuals who, for example, would not have been caught
dead mentioning Korematsu57 on September 10th in anything but
a derogatory way, but who on September 12 were saying in dis-
cussions, and important discussions, that maybe Korematsu has
something to tell us about detention and that the Constitution,
after all, was not designed to bring about national suicide.
I want to talk about three courts that were set up specially.
I want to set up a model that I think is different from our usual
model, both for capital punishment and for punishment gener-
ally, a model that we think of, and my colleagues have mentioned
this, as being based on some combination of retribution, on the
one hand, or deterrence on the other. I think David convincingly
showed us that neither of those standard models for capital pun-
ishment or for punishment generally applies in a world in which
the defendant may be seeking precisely that kind of extreme pun-
ishment, well publicized, or the martyrdom that the special
courts may indeed be imposing.
I think instead that special jurisdictions, at least if France is
our model, adopt a tripartite model or reason for special jurisdic-
tions and for capital punishment that is based on vengeance, mo-
rality, and status identification.
57 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
TERRORISM AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Now, these three things are not completely opposed to retri-
bution and deterrence, but the language asks us to think a little
bit differently about why these courts are set up, why people
think about them.
Vengeance, morality, and status identification.
The first special court-and I am going to discuss each of
these courts very briefly-that was set up by the French that did
not exist ahead of time to handle the question of defeat, to handle
the question of terrorism in the country, was the Cour Supreme
de Justice, a special supreme court that was set up for one
unique case. That was the prosecution of leaders of the Third
Republic for dereliction of duty that brought about the defeat of
the French.
Leon Blum, who was an outstanding individual and one of
the Third Republic Prime Ministers, was put on trial, as well as
Edouard Daladier-these are names that are probably familiar to
you-who were in charge of the French government at the time of
Hitler's increasing power. They were accused somewhat venge-
fully by this special court, which was set up just to try this
unique case, of creating the atmosphere that had led to French
defeat and that had placed the country now at risk not only of
demoralization and of complete vanquishment by the Germans,
but more importantly at risk of Socialist and left-wing forces who
were violent and who were threatening terrorism.
That court, to the best of my knowledge, which could have
imposed a capital sentence on these Third Republic leaders but
did not for reasons that would take too long to explain, but which
are implicitly fascinating, that court has not been depicted in any
French movie as far as I know, but the other two courts are:
The Tribunal d'Etat is a special court that was set up during
those four years, which I think primarily adjudicated morality.
The most famous case, which was a capital case decided by the
Tribunal d'Etat, does not have much to do with terrorism per se,
but does have to do with a very topical component of our subject
tonight: morality. That was a court that executed an abortionist,
executed a woman who was providing abortions within her small
town in France.
I believe that was the last woman executed by guillotine in
France. It happened in 1942. Capital punishment and special
courts conjoined here to impose on the country a sense of the mo-
rality of the leaders. Abortion typically in France had not been
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punished severely, if at all, and now you have this woman from a
small provincial village being guillotined.
Claude Chabrol, in his film, "Une Affaire de Femmes,"58 "A
Story of Women," which I very much recommend to you, bril-
liantly and evocatively describes both the court, the defendant,
the religious, moral background that worked against her, and the
dark atmosphere of Vichy morality that was at play in the pun-
ishment imposed on her.
The third court is the Special Section, the Section Speciale,
and here too we have a wonderful film rendition by Costa-
Gavras, who brought us "Z." An absolutely brilliant film. He is
less well known for this film, which is actually called "Special
Section,"59 and it is about the French court that was designed to
adjudicate the problem of terrorism, and which set up what I call
status identification, which associated terrorists with the three
groups I have mentioned and killed almost 600 people, in some
cases only because they happened to belong to the status group
that the country deemed to be threatening.
Costa-Gavras' film captures compellingly the atmosphere of
a country that feels itself under threat internally. Remember the
way it was from the French point of view. The enemy is not
really the Germans, and in the unoccupied zone you have, at
least until November of 1942, before which these courts had all
been set up, you have an autonomous regime that considered it-
self to be fully French. The threat was seen from within. The
threat was seen to order, to morality. The Special Section courts
engaged that particular threat in a manner that I will close
briefly by describing in somewhat greater detail.
First, I want to say that there was pressure to set up a court
like the Special Section, in part because people distrusted the
ability of the ordinary courts, which were doing their work, which
were somewhat overburdened, because the question of who was a
Jew created a complete explosion of litigation, was a huge busi-
ness, and in part for other reasons. Jewish judges, for example,
could no longer serve, and therefore you had a paucity of judges.
So, the ordinary courts were overtaxed.
The reason for the skepticism about the courts in France and
why people thought you needed special courts went beyond that.
58 UNE AFFAIRE DE FEMMES (New Yorker Video 1988).
59 SPECIAL SECTION (Goriz Films 1975).
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You have the following charge thrown at the ordinary judges:
"We all know that just about every judge in France has linked
hands with the Jews and the Freemasons. We could cite you fifty
decisions in which the most prestigious judges have tripped up
the laws concerning either the Jews or Freemasonry."
That kind of charge I think, fortunately, has very little cur-
rency in this country today, but what is going on in part is a very
natural and complex debate about the capacity of ordinary
courts. We put it on different grounds, the problems of the open-
ness of the courtroom, problems of evidence that might come out
in these trials if they were done the ordinary way, evidence that
might give solace to our enemies.
I just want to point out to you the generality that at least in
this historic period in France, and I think in many others, skepti-
cism exists in one way or another about the ability of ordinary
courts to handle the kinds of situations that deal with terrorism
that the special courts were better able to propose.
Barthelemy eventually regretted his signature establishing
the Special Sections more than any other law that he signed dur-
ing his two years as Justice Minister-remember the pre-war lib-
eral, and he signed a lot of pretty terrible laws-promulgated on
the 14th of August, 1941, about 14 months after the defeat. The
government has been set up in the southern zone. It sees that it
can legislate freely. It has already passed its major laws against
the Jewish population. Now it is focusing on terrorists. The fol-
lowing law is signed: "There is now instituted as part of each
military tribunal or each maritime tribunal one or several special
sections to which are referred the perpetrators of all penal infrac-
tions, whatever they may be, committed with the intent of Com-
munist or anarchist activity."60
"In the parts of the territory where military or maritime tri-
bunals would not sit, the jurisdiction of the Special Sections pro-
vided for in the paragraph above will be transmitted to a section
of the Court of Appeals, which rules without announcing its rea-
sons by deciding only on guilt and penalty."61
(I'm skipping most of the statute for the operative provisions
that I think may interest you tonight.)
Article 7. "Judgments rendered by the Special Section are
60 The Vichy Law of 14 Aug. 1941 in RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE
HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE 376 (1996).61Id.
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not amenable to appeal. They are executed immediately."62
Article 9. "Penalties available to the Special Section are life
im-prisonment with or without a fine, hard labor for a term of
life, or death, and no sentence can be less than that prescribed
for the crime alleged."63
Then this important jurisdictional Point 10: "All existing
bodies of inquiry or judgment of stripped of jurisdiction in favor
of the Special Section, which will in addition hear any complaint
against judgments made for failure to appear or in absentia."64
This law was procedurally and substantively startling. We
have heard a little of this from earlier speakers tonight, or analo-
gous, as it was designed ex post facto to punish people uncon-
nected with the actual crime. Often it is a threat to our tradi-
tional notions of justice where the crime in fact was not defined,
except as a status crime.
One last point that I think is very important. France, like
England, and like the United States from the late 18th century,
was really the constitutional home of what we think of as due
process, although France had tragically done away during these
four years with its equally longstanding tradition of equality,
which it taught us in the 18th century when we did not have any-
thing like equality in our own country, and, as you know, no
mention of equality in our Constitution at all until the Civil War
brought about that possibility; the French had been preaching
and, indeed, in their legal system until Vichy, practicing equality
until 1940. Equality clearly had been done away with by the
laws on the Jews.
Due process continued to exist. As we are seeing in the de-
velopment of regulations about these special courts in our coun-
try, it was a point of pride to Barthelemy and others that the de-
fendants were permitted to be represented by counsel.
Now, here I just want to drop a footnote. The footnote is
called Lynn Stewart, and I wonder if any of you have been follow-
ing Lynn Stewart's case. It is not talked about quite as much.
We do not know that much about it, but we do know that an at-
torney for an alleged terrorist herself has recently been in-
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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dicted. 65
The French did not do that. The French retained a notion of
due Process, as ironic and absurd as it may seem in the context of
a Special Section where five out of six defendants were shot the
next day, even though they were able to open their mouths in
their own defense and they had representation by lawyers. Law-
yers were not punished for their representation of these terribly
unpopular defendants.
Due process can co-exist in a pattern or development of spe-
cial procedures, we learn from history, in which, when we look
back on that history, nothing else seems right. Barthelemy, who
died almost right after the liberation, managed to state, as I said
earlier, his regret not for everything else that had happened, but
for this complete breach of French tradition that the Special Sec-
tions represented.
Yet, it must have been some consolation to him and to other
relatively right-minded French thinkers who went along without
much protest. Protest was possible during this period and oc-
curred on some levels, but not against these special sections.
There was very little protest in the legal community that I stud-
ied about the Special Sections.
Perhaps one of the reasons is that there was the aura of due
process, which correctly impresses lawyers, but I think in the
context of what is developing in this country I would just caution
that due process is not the whole ball game.
Thank you very much.
Norman Redlich
Thank you, and you made me very glad we have added to
this program someone with knowledge of what happened in
Vichy, France.
Our final speaker is Kenneth Roth, who is the Executive Di-
rector of Human Rights Watch, and who is going to bring to us an
international human rights perspective. He has been Executive
Director since 1993. It will surprise you to know that this
staunch defender of international human rights was previously
with the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New
65 See United States v. Stewart, 02 Cr.395, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10530, at "1-
9 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2002) (describing the facts surrounding Stewart's alleged
wrongdoings).
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York when our former Mayor Giuliani was the U.S. Attorney. He
worked under Judge Walsh in the Iran Contra investigation in
Washington. To me what is most significant is that Ken Roth
was a Weinfeld clerk. He reminded me that when I was Dean of
the NYU Law School on several occasions he served me break-
fast, which to normal people would occur at like 7 o'clock in the
morning, but to Judge Weinfeld was the equivalent of lunch. So,
Ken Roth and I have known each other a long time, although I
must admit it was rather blurred in my mind as to who served
me breakfast at a quarter to 7:00 in the morning.
I am pleased to present the Executive Director of Human
Rights Watch, Ken Roth.
Kenneth Roth
It was humbling to know that I was chosen for my clerkship
because of my previous experience as a waiter, but you take what
you can get.
When many people think about the human rights movement,
they think about political prisoners. That is certainly what I had
in mind when I started working in this field over twenty years
ago.
What has become clear, though, is that many of the atroci-
ties that we deal with happen in time of war. So, while I entered
the field thinking that I would be spending a lot of time dealing
with things like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights66 or
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,67 in fact
I have spent a huge amount of my time dealing with interna-
tional humanitarian law, or the laws of war. We need to sort out
what is right and what is not right in the midst of armed conflict.
About one-third of the work that Human Rights Watch does in
about seventy countries around the world involves trying to sort
out those questions: what is legitimate killing in time of war and
what is an abuse or a war crime.
Let me just begin by taking issue with something that Paul
Saunders said, which is that I actually think that humanitarian
law is much more fixed today, much more agreed to, much more
codified than is generally understood.
66 See UNITED NATIONS, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, in BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS 21-27 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1992).
67 See UNITED NATIONS, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 48-61 (W.J.F.M. van der Wolf ed., 1994).
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By that I do not mean that it has not evolved. I mean, if you
are a securities lawyer today and you said, "Well, the Founding
Fathers did not know anything about insider trading, but now it
is prohibited, therefore, the securities law is infinitely malleable."
You know that would not be very good advice.
Similarly, there has been evolution in the laws of war, but it
is evolution that has led to a fairly substantial codification of
what is and is not permitted. So, for example, the Geneva Con-
ventions of 194968 are a book about an inch thick, filled with
rules and regulations. They were updated in 197769 with what
are known as the additional protocols that deal with things like
air war, things that were not as pervasive, or at least not as gen-
erally well regulated during World War II, but were seen as
needing updating, particularly after the Vietnam War.
More recently, there were war crimes tribunals set up for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, with courts that are widely
respected that have issued rulings defining what these prohibi-
tions mean.70 Most recently, the Rome Treaty for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court adopted in 199871 actually codified what it
is to be a war crime, what it means to commit a crime against
humanity, and of course, what it means to commit genocide,
which has its own separate convention.72
So, while, of course, there are ambiguities in interpretation,
as there are in any law, there in fact is quite detailed codification
about what these crimes are. Thus, the problem that I have in
contemplating applying the death penalty in time of war is not so
much the ambiguity of the law. Particularly, the kinds of crimes
that we are talking about when we discuss terrorism are not gray
area crimes. The idea of deliberately trying to kill civilians, the
68 See CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS-GENEVA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS at 685-865, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.5, U.N. Sales
No. E.94.XIV.1 (1994).69 Id. at 866-944.
70 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 698-700 (1996); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS
AFTERMATH 91-93 (1996) (acknowledging the creation of International Criminal
Tribunals by the U.N. Security Council during the 1990s).
71 See generally COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE (Otto Triffterer ed.,
1999) (providing detailed commentary on and analysis of the statute).
72 See id.
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idea of crashing a civilian airplane into the World Trade Center,
there is nothing uncertain about the criminality of these acts.
Rather, I question whether it makes sense to apply the death
penalty, given some of the very practical consequences that
would face not only those of us-and I include myself here-who
are simply opposed to the death penalty per se, but also those
whose principal concern is, say, the safety of American soldiers
on the battlefield, or the safety of American soldiers should they
be captured by enemy forces.
These considerations, I think if you look a bit further, sug-
gest that it is not at all a good idea to be applying the death pen-
alty in terrorism or war-related cases.
Let me elaborate. I'll begin by clarifying one point. War is
obviously about killing. When you go to war you try to kill the
other side's soldiers. It is not nice, but that is what it is about.
We should not confuse that with the death penalty.
So, given that, of course, one shoots at the other side's sol-
diers, that does not automatically give license to capture the
other side's soldiers and execute them. Indeed there is some-
thing called the combatant's privilege, which is a very basic ele-
ment of humanitarian law, that says that if the only thing that
you have done is to shoot at enemy soldiers, you not only cannot
be executed for that, you cannot even be prosecuted. That in es-
sence there is a rule against criminalizing something that your
side is permitted to do, if the issue is simply shooting at or trying
to kill the other side's soldiers.
The issue of the death penalty comes in only if a soldier goes
beyond shooting at the other side's soldiers and commits viola-
tions of humanitarian law or war crimes. So, for example, if you
deliberately try to kill the other side's civilians, or if you fire in-
discriminately at the other side, indifferent to whether you are
hitting soldiers or civilians, or if you fire at a military target
knowing that, in fact, a hugely disproportionate number of civil-
ians are going to be killed-those are all understood as war
crimes. That gets you into the realm of prosecutable offenses
where, at least theoretically, the death penalty can be applied.
Even then, international humanitarian law is quite strict
about the kind of due process that one must be given. Article 75
of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions is un-
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derstood as sort of a bottom line list of due process protections. 73
For the most part you would be quite comfortable appearing be-
fore a court like that. The standards are actually rather high.
So, that is just a bit by way of background, but I still think,
nonetheless, there are many good reasons not to apply the death
penalty in time of war or in cases of terrorism. Let me just run
through them fairly quickly.
First, even though we can fairly readily understand the dif-
ference between shooting in combat versus summarily executing
or executing with due process somebody who is in custody, that is
a distinction that is often misunderstood. Too many people, par-
ticularly coming from a system where due process is not the or-
der of the day, do not see a big difference between an execution
after trial and an execution in the battlefield after some kind of
summary or non-existent procedure.
So, if you are thinking about the welfare of U.S. soldiers, the
last thing you want to do is to introduce the idea of executing
anybody in custody, whether it is with due process or not. Be-
cause too easily the lesson would be drawn that if they're killing
our soldiers when they capture them, we should kill the Ameri-
can soldiers, too. That is a big, big risk that any soldier faces in
enemy custody.
The death penalty also facilitates torture. If enemy forces
are going to execute the American soldier anyway, what is the
harm in torturing him and getting some information first. It is
too easy to fall into the logic of feeling that if this person is going
to be dead, why not make him suffer on the way to being killed.
So, just from the very narrow perspective of what is good for
American soldiers on the battlefield, I think we really have to
think twice before we get into the business of applying the death
penalty in times of war.
Second, is the issue of fallibility, which of course is an issue
with respect to the domestic application of the death penalty, but
I would suggest it is a much larger concern in time of war for
some of the reasons that have been discussed by my co-panelists,
especially the passions that tend to exist in time of war and the
tendency to resort to more summary procedures.
The two most famous World War II cases are perfect illustra-
71 See CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 56, Article 75, at 907.
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tions of this. One is the Quirin case, the Nazi saboteurs.34 One
theory of the case is that they were executed because of the huge
embarrassment that they had caused the FBI. The saboteurs
came to shore in Long Island and Florida, and one of them
promptly called the FBI and said, "Hey, we'd like to turn our-
selves in."
The FBI said, in essence, "Yeah, and the sky is falling," and
hung up.
They then called again, and finally somebody took them seri-
ously and they were arrested, but it was a tremendously embar-
rassing moment for the FBI, not only because the American fron-
tier had been pierced, but also because they had so incompetently
handled the initial efforts of the saboteurs to surrender. So,
there was a huge incentive on the part of the FBI to get these
people executed quickly. That is the sort of unfortunate gloss
that stands over the Quirin case.
The Yamashita case 75 is also notorious these days for misap-
plying the concept of command responsibility. In other words,
under existing law today it is generally understood that a com-
mander can be responsible for his or her forces, insofar as they
are committing war crimes, the commander knew of those war
crimes or should have known, and did not take steps within his
or her power to stop those atrocities.
Yamashita applied more of a strict liability test. The lower
forces were committing atrocities. We do not care whether the
commander knew about it or not. He is going to get executed.
So, these show the kinds of miscarriages of justice that can
exist even when the Supreme Court is passing judgment on a
case. We have all the more reason for concern when we are deal-
ing with something like the military commissions that President
Bush has proposed to be used for Guantanamo detainees or oth-
ers whom he certifies as being terrorists.7 6 Because in these
commissions, even with the new regulations that have been
promulgated by the Pentagon, there is no appeal to any kind of
independent court.77 That is to say, the President certifies a sus-
74 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 2 (1943) (furnishing the details leading to
the arrest of German nationals on American soil).
75 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 2 (1945).
76 See A Nation Challenged: President Bush's Order on the Trial of Terrorists by
Military Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at B8.
77 See Are Tribunals Fair? WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2002, at A18.
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pect as a terrorist.78 He then names the military judge who will
try the case. He then names the review panel that will review
whether the trial was fair. All these people are within the mili-
tary chain of command. There is no Congressional confirmation
of oversight. There is no option of appeal at all to anything re-
sembling a civilian court.
If you had a traditional court martial, ultimately you have
the option of petitioning the United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces, which is an Article I civilian court that stands
entirely outside the military chain of command. 79 From there,
petition is permitted to the U.S. Supreme Court. For utterly in-
explicable reasons, President Bush chose not to provide those
safeguards for people who are prosecuted by military commis-
sions. You are essentially facing a prosecutor and a judge, all of
whom are Bush or Bush surrogates. The executive branch is
serving as the prosecutor and the judge.
There are other kinds of problems with these military com-
missions which I will not dwell on, but let me just run through
them quickly. There is no habeas corpus review, no opportunity
to challenge the legality of your detention. Military defense
counsel is the only counsel permitted to see certain classified evi-
dence. Civilian counsel cannot see that evidence and the defen-
dant himself cannot see that evidence. That is the accommoda-
tion made to permit prosecution with classified evidence that was
chosen for these military commissions-a very different balance
than that set in civilian courts under the Classified Information
Procedures Act.80
We have heard that the Bush administration is contemplat-
ing conspiracy prosecutions without necessarily showing any in-
dividualized evidence that the suspect to join the criminal con-
spiracy or attempted to further its objectives in any way. They
are at least toying with the idea of status crimes. You are on the
battlefield in Afghanistan; you are a foreigner; therefore, you
must be per se Al Qaeda; therefore, you must be guilty. While
they have not gone forward with this theory yet, they floated it in
78 See A Nation Challenged, supra note 74.
79 See Establishment of the Court, at
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/Establis.htm (2002) ("[Tlhis Federal Court is
established under Article I of the Constitution which gives to Congress the
power to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces.").80 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
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The New York Times a week ago just to see how people would re-
act. I am again showing the kind of shortcuts that are being con-
templated. Of course, that kind of status offense could get the
person executed.
Then, there is the problem of discrimination, that these
commissions discriminate on the basis of nationality. If you are
an American citizen, you will not be brought before these com-
missions. If you are a foreigner, even a foreign resident of the
United States, you could be brought before them. That kind of
discrimination is flatly prohibited by international law, but is
written there in black and white in the Bush Military Order.8 '
Finally, these commissions do not apply only to offenses on
the battlefield, which is the traditional scope of military jurisdic-
tions, but they can apply to anyone anywhere in the world who is
a non-citizen who Bush decides to designate a terrorist. This
could be someone in Germany whom U.S. forces conceivably
could pick up and ship to Guantanamo, completely circumventing
existing criminal justice guarantees, and try and execute in this
Executive-branch-as-judge-and-prosecutor kind of tribunal, with
none of the guarantees that we usually think of as being secure
for crimes allegedly committed away from the battlefield.
These are the kinds of procedural shortcuts that we have
even after a well-considered military order debated for months by
the Pentagon to try to fix the defects and promulgate regulations
that were supposed to be acceptable. We still end up with a fa-
tally flawed tribunal.
It is only going to get worse if some kind of quick emergency
commission is set up on the battlefield, which was the original
justification for military commissions. There is no civilian court
to be found so you have to set up an ad hoc court on the battle-
field to deal with battlefield offenses.
The due process shortcuts are much, much worse in that bat-
tlefield situation. Naturally it will be much worse in other coun-
tries that are not as impeded as President Bush is by a legal
community that is concerned with these due process guarantees.
We have already seen, for example, Egypt saying, "Well, if
you are going to have military commissions, stop criticizing us for
the summary military trials that we give to our terrorist suspects
before executing them."
81 See 3 C.F.R. § 4 (2001).
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Again, we have to recognize that there is a tendency, as we
saw in Vichy France, to ignore basic due process guarantees in
time of war, and those should be the last circumstances in which
we want to proceed to the ultimate punishment of death.
A few other pragmatic considerations: first, we clearly need
the support of our allies if we are going to succeed in the war
against terrorism, but there is nothing that inhibits allied coop-
eration more than the fact that suspects in the United States can
face the death penalty. Already, no European country, nor Can-
ada, nor Australia, nor most of our democratic allies around the
world will extradite or surrender a suspect to the United States
without a guarantee that he or she will not face the death pen-
alty. That is an actual requirement in Europe imposed by the
European Convention on Human Rights as interpreted by the
European Court on Human Rights.8 2
Already you get the problem of the inequities between people
who happen to be picked up by American troops and people who
happen to be in another country facing surrender to the United
States. Other countries just will not surrender or extradite
someone here and if they are going to face the death penalty.
This leads to particular problems on the battlefield, in Af-
ghanistan, for example, where the U.S. is attempting to cooper-
ate with British and French troops. Imagine the confusion if the
French troops pick somebody up and then say, "Well, we cannot
hand them over to our American colleague next door because we
are going to get in trouble back home for facilitating the death
penalty."
Already there is a scandal in Canada, because some Cana-
dian troops were accused of having handed over a suspect in Af-
ghanistan, the kind of ordinary cooperation on the field that
should be routine but is interrupted because of the U.S. insis-
tence, against all trends among democracies, in applying the
death penalty.8 3
82 See Sam Dillon & Donald G. McNeil Jr., A Nation Challenged: Spain Sets
Hurdle For Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at Al (noting that the U.S.
must often negotiate for extradition and European Union policy says that no
extradition may occur without reassurance that the death penalty will not be
sought).
83 See Clifford Krauss, A Nation Challenged: Canada's Transfer of Prisoners to
U.S. Roils Politicians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A12 (acknowledging Cana-
dian political uproar brought about by transfer of Afghanistan captives from
Canadian to American forces).
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The death penalty also endangers U.S. troops by undermin-
ing efforts to achieve surrender. It is clearly always better to get
opposing forces to wave the white flag rather than to fight to the
death. We saw how dangerous it is when people are fighting to
the death, most recently at Tora Bora, where Al Qaeda members
put up an incredibly fierce fight because they thought it was a
life or death matter, that there essentially was no option of sur-
render.8 4
Insofar as America applies the death penalty, it facilitates
the view around the world that you are going to get killed one
way or the other, so you may as well take a bunch of American
soldiers with you. That is the last signal that American troops
need to be sending when they are facing dangerous adversaries
overseas.
There is a formal prohibition against taking no prisoners. It
is the prohibition of giving no quarter.8 5 I do not equate the
death penalty with that, but many foreign troops who presume
they are going to face a kangaroo court if brought before the mili-
tary commissions are going to assume that essentially it is death
now versus death later, so why not face death now while going
down shooting, rather than surrender and face death later with-
out having fired a shot.
That is not a very useful message from the perspective of
American troops in very dangerous situations in Afghanistan or
elsewhere.
I think it is also useful to look at the alternatives, which are
obviously long-term or life imprisonment. I would suggest that
imprisonment is an adequately bleak future from the perspective
of many of these terror suspects to be a sufficient deterrent, to
supply sufficient vengeance, to meet the various criminal justice
goals that are said to be furthered by the application of the death
penalty.
David already discussed the concern of martyrdom. You
84 See US Renews Assault on Tora Bora, BBC NEWS, (Dec. 13, 2001), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south-asi/newsid_1705000/1705198.stm
("Bin Laden's most trusted aide.., told the London-based magazine al-Majallah
that he and other senior al-Qaeda leaders ... do not hide in caves and do not
run away from the confrontation. Suicide is our desire and our victory....").
85 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
1), Jun. 8, 1977, 6 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1979).
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know many of these people want martyrdom, and you are only
facilitating that by applying the death penalty. I do not think all
Al Qaeda members want to go down as martyrs. I think there is
a noticeable tendency on the part of senior commanders every-
where, including Al Qaeda, to be self-protective. We do not see
Bin Laden volunteering for capture and execution. We are not
going to see that any time soon. The desire to preserve one's life
is pretty intense among many people, even Muslim believers.
I would not overstate this, but I do think that the prospect of
facing a life in prison in some ways may be an even larger deter-
rent, because it does not give the great public platform of an exe-
cution. Who remembers Manuel Noriega,8 6 who is just languish-
ing in prison? Noriega at one stage was as notorious as Bin
Laden, but he has been condemned to a life of nothingness.
I think that life imprisonment is a sufficient deterrent if we
want to apply a penalty to terrorists or would-be terrorists.
There has been concern expressed that imprisoning people
for a long time will provide an incentive on the part of terrorists
to take hostages in an effort to free them. But I think there is
also a danger of retaliation, should terrorist leaders be killed.
You are always going to find people who are going to go out and
randomly try to kill Americans. There are many Americans
around who are easy targets.
It is obviously easier, in a cowardly way, for politicians sim-
ply to have Americans killed than to have to face the tough deci-
sions in a hostage situation of whether to give in in a hostage
situation by freeing prisoners or whether to try to free the hos-
tages. That is the kind of dilemma that no politician wants to
face. I do not think we should be making our decisions about the
death penalty out of a desire to make politicians' lives easier. I
think there are other more serious concerns at stake.
Finally, let me conclude by noting that not only do most de-
mocracies around the world now prohibit the death penalty at
home and prohibit any cooperation with the death penalty any-
place else, including extradition or investigative cooperation, but
they also, at a very profound level, view the death penalty as ut-
terly inhumane.
Most Europeans view the death penalty as a violation of hu-
86 See Timeline: Panama, BBC NEWS, Mar. 21, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_129000/1229333.stm.
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man rights. It is not written that way on the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. The focus is on arbitrary de-
nial of the right to life,87 but most residents of democracies
around the world now do equate the death penalty per se with a
very severe violation of human rights.
Indeed, the international consensus is so strong that even for
the most heinous crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity there is an absolute prohibition on the death
penalty on the part of the various international tribunals that
have been established to deal with these crimes. So, the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal
Court, none of them permit the death penalty for the most severe
human rights crimes imaginable.88 That demonstrates how deep
the sense of revulsion is worldwide at the application of the death
penalty anyplace.
When the U.S. applies the death penalty in fighting terror-
ism it is seen, in a basic sense, as using the tools of the terrorists.
Because for me, the logic of terrorism is, "Anything goes in the
name of the cause." You can even kill civilians if that is seen to
further your political or religious aims. For many Europeans,
when America applies the death penalty it is sending the mes-
sage that anything goes in the name of fighting terrorism.
Now, I am not going to equate the death penalty with geno-
cide or crimes against humanity or war crimes, but I want to
stress that many Europeans view it in comparable terms, as at
least a very severe violation of human rights. They view it as us-
ing terrorist tools to fight terrorism. And that is a message,
whether intended or not, that at a very profound level under-
mines the moral high ground that I think the United States must
maintain if it is going to succeed in waging the war against ter-
rorism.
Thank you.
87 See United Nations Association in Canada, Questions and Answers About the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at
http://www.unac.org/rights/question.html. (2002).
88 See Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal
Law: An Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. INT'L & COMP L.
REV. 53, 63 (2001).
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Norman Redlich
Thank you, Ken.
I would not just like to ask the panelists if they would like to
ask questions of each other, and then there is a microphone in
the audience if someone would like to stand up and get ready to
be recognized after the panelists have asked questions of each
other. Anybody?
Okay, let us turn to our audience.
Discussion
AUDIENCE MEMBER: To what extent do any of you find
the term non-combatant terrorist an oxymoron?
MR. REDLICH: For the record, could you just identify -
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Jordana Horn-Marinoff I am a
member of the Committee on Capital Punishment.
MR. SAUNDERS: I do find it an oxymoron. In the following
sense. Let me explain a little bit more what I mean by that.
The notion of a combatant historically is thought to be a
member of an armed force. If you are a combatant, there are cer-
tain rules that you need to follow. Those are the laws of war.
Many of them are codified in treaties; some of them are not, but
the laws of war apply to combatants.
Also, if you are a combatant, you are entitled to certain pro-
tections. If you are captured, you are required to be treated as a
prisoner of war. You are entitled to the protections of the Geneva
Convention, for example.
Well, the question is, if you are a terrorist are you a combat-
ant or not? Are you a member of a military force or not? Are you
acting on behalf of a nation-state or not? There is an ambiguity,
there is a schizophrenia about the way in which we treat the
people in Guantanamo Bay, for example? Are they combatants
or not?
Let us assume that they are terrorists. Let us just assume
they are, whatever that means. They have committed some
crime against humanity, but are they combatants or not?
If they are combatants, then they are entitled to the protec-
tion, at least as far as we have understood it, of the Geneva Con-
vention and required to be treated as prisoners of war.
We are clearly not treating them that way. So, our govern-
ment has assumed that they are non-combatants.
So what are they? Who are they? Are they terrorists? If
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they are terrorists and if they are not combatants, they can be
prosecuted under all the laws that we already have on the books
that prohibit the crimes that they committed.
If they are combatants, then we can say that they violated
the laws of war, which the military order allows them to be
prosecuted for violating. They are also entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.
That was one of the problems that the United States gov-
ernment faced in the trial of the Nazi saboteurs. They were
members of the German military. So, why were they not they
treated as prisoners of war? Well, because they were thought to
be "unlawful combatants." That does not mean that they did
something to break the law. It meant that, as I said before, they
buried their uniforms. The Geneva Conventions requires that to
be a lawful combatant you have to wear a uniform with insignia
to designate that you are in the military. If you do not wear a
uniform, as the Geneva Convention requires, then you are not
entitled to be treated as a combatant.8 9
So, the Supreme Court created this new category that it
called "unlawful combatants." It did not mean that they did
something unlawful, but they were no longer entitled to be
treated as if they were combatants.
They were not prosecuted by court martial. They could have
been prosecuted in the civilian courts, because they theoretically
committed a crime in the United States, maybe. Instead, they
were tried by a military commission, which theretofore had never
prosecuted civilians.
So, whether the term unlawful, non-combatant terrorist is
an oxymoron or not, the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, lawful and unlawful combatants is an extremely dif-
ficult one. When you apply it to terrorists you have to say that
they are members of some military force somewhere and that
they have taken themselves out of the protections of the Geneva
Convention by becoming unlawful or unprivileged combatants.
If they are plain civilians, albeit maybe terrorists, but if they
are plain civilians and not otherwise connected with a military or
an armed force of a nation-state, at least heretofore we have
never treated such people as combatants.
89 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 134.
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MR. ROTH: May I try my hand at a quick clarification. This
is a complicated area. Let me make two points.
One is, with respect to Guantanamo, it is useful to think in
terms of three categories of people: combatants who are entitled
to full prisoner of war protection; so-called unlawful or unprivi-
leged combatants who are not entitled to POW protection; and
then the third category would just be civilians or non-
combatants.
In Guantanamo, the major problem with what the Bush ad-
ministration has been doing is that the Taliban detainees, that is
to say, the members of Afghanistan's regular armed forces,
clearly should have been given POW status. You just read Arti-
cle 4 of the Third Geneva Convention 90 and it's absolutely
straightforward.
The Bush administration, for I think somewhat childish psy-
chological reasons, is refusing to do that, and is blatantly violat-
ing the Geneva Conventions.
The Al Qaeda members in Guantanamo probably do not
qualify for POW status. They fall more in this unlawful combat-
ant area. The reason it matters is that if you are a POW, you can
still be prosecuted for war crimes, but you have to be given the
same protections that the detaining power, the United States,
would give its own soldiers if prosecuted for similar crimes. That
is to say, a court martial, which has a right of appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the armed forces, the civilian
court, and a variety of other protections that the military com-
missions deny.
By threatening to bring the Taliban detainees before the
military commissions, the Bush administration is proposing to
circumvent these procedural protections and thus to violate the
Geneva Convention.
A second area of controversy surrounds the question of when
the detainees must be released. It is generally understood that
the detaining power can hold a combatant until the end of the
armed conflict, regardless of prosecution. So, the issue is going to
come up, 'Well, when is the war over?"
In Afghanistan, it is going to be clear at some point, probably
within a year or so, that the war will be over. So, Rumsfeld is al-
ready toying with this idea of the war on terrorism extends to
90 /d.
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some sixty different countries. A war like that can go on for a
long, long time. And the Pentagon is proposing to detain these
people until that war is over with.
That is a big problem because at some stage active hostility,
soldiers shooting each other, is going to be over with. We may
still have a problem of terrorism, but it is not going to be a prob-
lem different in kind from other kinds of traditional criminal
problems we face.
I think the best analogy is drug trafficking. We have a rhe-
torical war on drug trafficking, but nobody would propose ran-
domly picking up alleged drug traffickers and detaining them
forever until the war on drug trafficking is over with, let alone
shooting to kill drug traffickers on the battlefield of whatever ur-
ban corner it happens to be, which would be the consequence of
treating a rhetorical war as a real war.
So, I think the real difficulty we are going to face is that at
some point even members of Al Qaeda are going to be nothing
more than common criminals. The war in any realistic sense is
going to be over. We are going to be back to a rhetorical war. If
the Bush administration then proposes nonetheless to detain
people without prosecuting them, it is going to be moving into the
realm of administrative or preventive detention, which violates
the most basic rules of human rights. It is something you just do
not do. But that is at least what they are toying with doing right
now. It is a huge danger we are facing down the road.
MR. REDLICH: Next question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Robert Blecker. I have
two questions actually about two themes that have pervaded this
discussion.
The first one was introduced by Norman Greene when he
talked about the declining popularity of the death penalty. I am
curious to know whether he can cite any poll post-September
11th or even post-McVeigh that will demonstrate that.
Then that theme was further picked up by David Bruck,
who, by my count, six times talked about democracy and the
death penalty. "Almost the entire Western democratic world has
abolished the death penalty except us. Democratic progress has
been made by the abolition of the death penalty."
Then we got more of that. Richard Weisberg talked about
the general public revulsion toward the death penalty. Kenneth
Roth several times talked about our democratic allies, et cetera,
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and United States resistance to all trends among democracies.
So, my first question has to do with that theme, and I am cu-
rious as to why candor does not force any of you to acknowledge
that every one of the Western democracies that you cite which
abolished the death penalty, including France, England, Great
Britain, and Canada, in the face of public support for it, and in
fact took an anti, non-democratic move in the abolition of the
death penalty precisely because the governments of those coun-
tries thought that they knew better than their own people as to
what was right and what was wrong.
Once you acknowledge that, or if you do not, I am curious if
democracy is your issue, does public support in the United States
entitle us to extraordinary procedures? So, that is the first ques-
tion.
The second question about the other major theme that has
pervaded this conversation tonight is one about emergencies and
extraordinary measures.
We heard about that, and again Professor Weisberg it seems
to me, developed that. Here I am puzzled about what he means
by what he says, and I hope I am quoting correctly, "We are fac-
ing what the government calls the threat of terrorism," which
implication, it seems to me, is that the government may call it a
threat of terrorism but some of us know better that there really is
not a threat of terrorism going on now.
I am curious to know from Professor Weisberg whether he is
suggesting, contrary to what I understand to be the reality, that
we have no threat of terrorism; or instead he is suggesting some-
thing more subtle, which is what I suspect he is, which is that
contrary to Locke, prerogative now counts for nothing. That is, I
am not quite sure what his position is on: a) whether we are in
an emergency situation, and b) if we are in an emergency situa-
tion, to what does that entitle us in terms of emergency proce-
dures?
I would ask Kenneth Roth the same question. Are we in an
emergency, and are we entitled to react toward that emergency
in an extraordinary way?
Just one comment, if I might. You mentioned Noriega living
a life, how did you put it, living a life of nothingness in terms of
life being a sufficient deterrent. Unless Noriega's conditions
have changed, and I have not followed them in the last few years,
Noriega was spending his life in prison in a two-room suite with
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exercise machines and a color television.
MR. REDLICH: Those are several questions. Anyone want
to answer them?
MR. BRUCK: To respond quickly to the notion that because
the public still supported the death penalty according to opinion
polls at the time that democracies abolished capital punishment
one should therefore infer that the abolition of the death penalty
was anti-democratic I think is only a notion you can sustain if
you have a sort of plebiscitary concept of democracy. It is true
that political leadership went ahead of public opinion in France,
Great Britain, and Canada, indeed virtually every democracy. In
Germany and West Germany, the death penalty was abolished in
effect at bayonet point by the Allied powers. Eventually public
opinion came to favor the most severe punishment that remained
on the books. Now, of course, public opinion in Germany is over-
whelmingly anti-death penalty and they send money to people
out in Texas to help fight against it here.
In the United States, public opinion polls depend entirely on
the question that is asked. If you ask people, "Are you for or
against the death penalty?", you will get the majority supporting
the death penalty. If you ask people a question that encompasses
the alternative of life without parole, you have plurality support,
or indeed, minority support, that is, lack of support for capital
punishment. So, the question of what the public favors is by no
means simple.
We nevertheless see a phenomenon throughout the world
that wherever democracy advances, the death penalty recedes.
For example, the abolition of the death penalty is one of the first
orders of business with the liberation of Eastern Europe, the end
of Communism. It was likewise one of the first orders of business
with the disappearance of apartheid from South Africa, although
it was done, if you please, in an undemocratic fashion by a court
decision.
Nevertheless, the pattern is quite striking. As democracy
advances throughout the world the death penalty disappears. I
would suggest that there is something more profound than that
which could be elucidated from public opinion polls.
In matters that appear to affect personal safety, the public is
always conservative. Whatever the most severe criminal sanc-
tion is on the books, whatever it might be, is going to be favored
by many or most people until such time it is changed. When it
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goes, public opinion eventually adjusts.
The phenomenon that we have seen throughout the world of
the relationship, the historic relationship between the extension
of human rights, democratic values, and the abolition of the
death penalty is too extensive to be a coincidence. For that rea-
son I think it is not unfair to link the two, not to say that a coun-
try that has the death penalty is ipso facto non-democratic, but
that the relationship is more complex than your question sug-
gests.
MR. REDLICH: Professor Weisberg, do you want to respond
to the second question?
PROFESSOR WEISBERG: Right. Because the first point I
would make, just as a formal matter, since I mentioned Robert
Badinter and the National Assembly under his leadership, and
because of the drive and force of his aversion to capital punish-
ment, as I described it, the National Assembly, both houses, and
I think we consider that a form of representative democracy,
abolished capital punishment.
I think you are right. They were ahead of the curve of
probably the polling in that country, although today I think the
French-who can be quite wrong about many things-
overwhelmingly now support the view that the abolition of the
death penalty was a move I would say not so much in the direc-
tion of democracy, I do not think I used those words, but in the
direction of the development of a civilized criminal justice sys-
tem.
We feel differently in the United States. I was careful to say
about capital punishment in the United States that the methods
of capital punishment are in some ways more repulsive to Ameri-
cans when they learn more about it, when it becomes less privat-
ized, when images of somebody actually being electrocuted-the
electric chair being the last such method that has been widely
publicized and litigated-goes out over the Web and people see
what happens to a person's head. Some of those notions of what
constitutes civilized retribution change.
I think only forceful leadership in the context of a society
which is ready to continue to be educated about capital punish-
ment, only forceful leadership and we are not necessarily getting
that right now, will bring the democratic process to bear if the
court does not get out ahead of the curve on Eighth Amendment
grounds.
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Then very quickly on the point that you made. Yes, I used
my words very carefully: what the government calls terrorism.
Part of the theme of my paper, and I certainly do not think
that any of us were called up here necessarily to give our own in-
dividual perspectives on things, the theme of my paper is that
notions of emergency, notions of terrorism, and we have seen in
subsequent conversation that it is an ill-defined term, call on
every citizen, precisely your call to democracy, I think, call on
every citizen to reflect on what the government in fact is saying.
That does not mean necessarily that one disagrees ultimately,
but like every other democratic and complex issue that we are
confronted with, including capital punishment-and the question
of terrorism what constitutes terrorism, how do we respond to it
as a threat, is it always going to be a threat, what is it, who is
causing this threat-is something I think we each have to reflect
on and continue to be educated about.
MR. REDLICH: I would like to ask David Bruck to respond
to the point that I made, which was namely that the Israelis have
managed to separate the crime of genocide from the crime of first
degree murder. Why can we not do the same thing? Even if the
death penalty were abolished for other crimes, could we retain it
for terrorism in the same way that the Israelis have retained the
death penalty for genocide?
MR. BRUCK: Well, we can, but I think it maybe highlights a
problem in our system of divided powers that makes it exceed-
ingly unlikely that any attempt to segregate a narrower death
penalty would remain narrow.
We are all aware, I think, of the recent proposals of the Ryan
Commission in Illinois to drastically scale back the death penalty
in Illinois by reducing, which is a much less radical but the same
sort of reform proposal that you outlined to try to isolate the
death penalty to the worst of the worst, to the most extreme and
egregious cases and leave the rest for life without parole or some
other sanction.
Considering the difficulty we have got, it is very, very hard
to imagine the legislative branch in our government actually
making a list that included nothing but Eichmann, or nothing
but genocide, or nothing but the attack on the World Trade Cen-
ter, or some other crime against humanity of an ungodly scale
and leaving everything else off the list.
I think part of the reason for that has to do with what indeed
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may be the primary reason why the United States still has the
death penalty at all, and that is the fact that the legislature can
respond to political pressure without having the ultimate respon-
sibility for the results in a system where the courts ultimately
have to decide who, if anyone, gets executed, and then the execu-
tive branch has to actually administer the results at the end of
the line, and each branch of government points to the other as
responsible. When the courts finally get the cases they say that
they cannot really be the ultimate arbiter of this because the leg-
islature has made the considered decision, neglecting, of course,
that the legislature made the decision precisely in the confidence
that the courts would sort everything out. In the end, the buck
gets passed by both branches to the executive to use clemency,
which is virtually stillborn in the post-Furman era of the death
penalty. The death penalty is back, but clemency, at least until
very, very recently, was not.
It is in theory, I think, a very promising idea that the death
penalty for terrorism could be restricted extremely narrowly, and
in so doing we could simply define out of existence many of the
problems that we have been talking about tonight. But it is not
going to happen. As legislators, given the great freedom that the
Congressmen and Senators have as the political leadership in our
system of divided government, begin to make up laundry lists of
crimes they are going to penalize and crimes they are going to
identify without taking ultimate responsibility for who, if anyone,
gets sentenced, the list gets longer and longer and longer.
Indeed that is what we have seen ever since Furman.91 Each
state started with a short list of aggravating factors, and now the
aggravating factors have multiplied; year after year there has
been this accretion of new capital crimes so that the list of aggra-
vating factors in most states is now pretty much a description of
the entire universe of first-degree murder.
That is different than most other-all other--democratic
countries, which have faced the music and abolished the death
penalty at a moment of truth: when the legislative branch real-
ized that if the vote was for death, there would be execution, and
if the vote was against, there would not be. That responsibility
91 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1971) (holding that "the impo-
sition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments" be-
cause the statutes arbitrary assigned the death penalty).
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came to rest on legislators who took what, at the time, I will
freely acknowledge, were opinions contrary to the polls.
How come American politicians do not ever take a position
that is contrary to the polls on this profoundly difficult issue that
calls out for leadership? I think partly because of the fact that
our system allows an evasion of responsibility. Whereas in Eng-
land and Canada and France, in all the other democracies, Par-
liament, the National Assembly, is supreme; there is no judicial
review, there is not this diffusion of responsibility, and the mo-
ment of truth never has to be faced by anybody in the system.
MR. REDLICH: Okay. Unless there are any panelists who
have anything to say?
MR. SAUNDERS: I would like to comment on that.
Let me choose my words carefully. I think it is intellectually
unsatisfying to say that I am opposed to the death penalty except
for genocide.
Genocide, I think the Genocide Convention, which, the last
time I looked, we have still not ratified.
MR. REDLICH: We have ratified it.
MR. SAUNDERS: We have?
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as certain prohib-
ited acts with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group. I do not find any difference between a crime
committed with that intent and, for example, the crime commit-
ted by Timothy McVeigh. I think that if you are against the
death penalty you are against the death penalty for reasons un-
related to the type of crime.
If you admit that the death penalty is permissible for certain
types of crimes, i.e. genocide, I find it very hard to distinguish
that crime from the World Trade Center attack, which, I have not
studied this question, but which probably does not qualify as
genocide because there is no evidence that it was carried out with
an intent to destroy a national ethnic, racial or religious group.
In any event, I find it somewhat unsatisfying to carve out ex-
ceptions for which one would permit the death penalty if one is
otherwise opposed to the death penalty on moral or any other
grounds. I find that very difficult.
MR. REDLICH: Any further comments?
I want to thank our panel and thank our audience.
